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FROM OBSESSION TO CONFESSION:
A FALSE CONFESSION PARADIGM
IN THE MURDER OF JONBENET
RAMSEY
Morgan S. Moffa
Judith Platania
Roger Williams University
In this study, we used a fact pattern similar to the John Mark Karr scenario to
examine perceptions of DNA and confession evidence. Specifically, we hypothesized that DNA evidence, confessor level of psychopathology, and presence or
absence of Miranda protections would affect participants’ perceptions of guilt
and attitudes towards the interrogation process. One hundred nine undergraduates
read a two-page summary based on John Mark Karr’s confession. Summaries
varied based on psychopathology of confessor, the presence or absence of DNA
evidence, and the provision of Miranda warnings prior to confession. The DNA
manipulation explained participants’ attitudes towards specific aspects of the interrogation process. The importance of perceptions of forensic type evidence, specifically DNA, in our legal system is discussed.

INTRODUCTION
Psychological evaluation of interrogations and the confessions they often produce has resulted in a significant number of
published studies (Forrest, Wadkins, & Larson, 2006; Kassin &
Gudjonsson, 2004; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Kassin & McNall,
1991; Gudjonsson, 2006; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Leo,
1996; Ofshe & Leo, 1997). These studies have provided valuable insight into why an innocent person would confess to a heinous crime.
To date, however, no studies have investigated voluntary confessions and the factors involved in their evaluations. Although infreCorrespondence concerning this article should be addressed to Morgan S. Moffa,
or Judith Platania, Roger Williams University, One Old Ferry Road, Bristol, RI 02809;
Phone: 401-254-5738; Email: momoffa@yahoo.com, or jplatania@rwu.edu
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quent, voluntary self-incrimination occurs, and the false confession
of John Mark Karr to the murder of JonBenet Ramsey has brought
national attention to this legal and psychological event.
In his confession to JonBenet Ramsey’s homicide, John
Mark Karr offered himself to law enforcement as the killer by providing a voluntary confession. Lack of DNA evidence linking John
Mark Karr to JonBenet Ramsey prevented the prosecution from taking this case to trial. Mr. Karr’s legal status would almost certainly
be different if he had provided his confession 25 years ago. At the
time, DNA evidence was not yet an available and reliable form of
evidence. As a result, this type of forensic evidence was not necessary to obtain a conviction. Today, however, DNA evidence can
provide definitive proof of guilt or innocence.
The Warren Court’s due-process revolution (Epstein &
Walker, 2000), case law (Brown v. Mississippi, 1936; Colorado
v. Connelly, 1986; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966), and social change
(Bonsignore et al., 1989) have altered how we examine and evaluate confession evidence. We have moved from the assumption that a
confession equates guilt to a search for additional evidence in order
to confirm the validity of a confession. In John Mark Karr’s case, his
confession became a necessary, although not sufficient prerequisite
for guilt. Specific corroborative evidence was needed, and the focus
was on DNA confirmation. Research has found, however, that testimony alone lacks the power of DNA evidence. In a study conducted
by Moffa (2006), corroboration in the form of testimony evidence
was insufficient to convince participant-jurors of a confessor’s guilt
when no forensic-type evidence was available. This result shows a
shift in our system of jurisprudence from the absolute belief in confession evidence to a more balanced evaluation of believability and
confirmation (McCormick, 1972).
The Karr paradigm raises questions for an empirical evaluation of the voluntary confession: How are perceptions of a voluntary confession affected by DNA evidence, Miranda warnings, and
mental illness? In the present study, we manipulated DNA corroboration, presence or absence of Miranda protections, and confessor
level of psychopathology portrayed in the confession. We were pri-
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marily interested in the impact of these factors on verdict, as well
as perceptions of the reliability and probative validity of DNA and
confession evidence.
Psychopathology
Psychopathology is an important consideration in evaluating
factors in various adjudicative contexts. Yarvis (2000) investigated
psychological characteristics of defendants found guilty of a capital
offense and the effect of psychopathology on prosecutorial and juror
discretion. Defendants described as having poor reality testing, poor
impulse control, or a history of physical abuse during childhood
were most likely to be qualified as “special” and were more likely
to receive a sentence other than death. In this study, jurors perceived
mental illness as a robust mitigating factor in sentencing. As a result,
significant effects were observed for qualitatively severe mental illness, such as a psychotic diagnosis. Conversely, Cochrane, Grisso,
and Frederick (2001) examined the effect of diagnosis on pretrial
disposition concerning competency to stand trial. Their findings indicated schizophrenia as the most likely diagnosis stemming from
a competency evaluation. When prior findings on the relationship
between perceptions of culpability and mental illness are interpreted
in the context of a voluntary confession, it is reasonable to predict
psychopathology would diminish the believability of the confessor. It is also reasonable to predict psychopathology would enhance
perceptions of culpability, as individuals with mental illness are
considered dangerous (Monahan, et al., 2001). In the context of the
present study, we predicted attitudes towards the interrogation process would differ as a function of confessor psychopathology and
provisions of Miranda warnings.
Miranda Warnings
In Colorado v. Connelly (1986), Connelly voluntarily reported a homicide he had committed to Denver police. He waived
his Miranda warning prior to confessing, and by all outward appearances, his confession was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon
psychiatric evaluation, it was shown that Connelly was suffering
from active psychotic symptoms at the time of his Miranda waiver
and confession. From a clinical perspective, Connelly’s judgment

© Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 2008, 4(2)

MOFFA AND PLATANIA

231

was grossly impaired and cast doubt on the fidelity of the waiver
and confession. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
Connelly’s 5th Amendment due process right had not been violated.
In the eyes of the law this meant that the absence of coercive interrogation practices demonstrated free will in offering a confession.
Therefore, mental status or diagnosis was not dispositive for questions of voluntariness. For mentally incompetent individuals, this
decision called into question legal protections against self-incrimination and Miranda warnings (Cheney, 1987).
Colorado illustrates the interaction of psychopathology and
Miranda waivers in the context of a voluntary confession. The confessor had received the diagnosis of schizophrenia and had untreated symptoms at the time he confessed to a police officer he found
on the street. The Miranda waiver was ultimately found to be valid
and the confession was admissible, in part because no outside coercion was evident. The present study will test whether participants’
perceptions of a Miranda waiver and confessor differ from the legal
opinion of circumstances surrounding the waiver and confession in
Connelly.
DNA Evidence
Media exposure to sophisticated forensic evidence, specifically DNA, has altered public perceptions of forensic-type evidence’s
reliability and utility to demonstrate a defendant’s guilt or innocence
(Moffa & Platania, 2007; Stinson, Smith, Patry, Fitzsimmons, &
Finney, 2006). Given the probabilistic nature of forensic DNA analysis error (e.g., one in one million), this evidence is afforded a status
of high reliability (Golding, Stewart, Yozwiak, Djadali, & Sanchez,
2000; Schklar & Diamond, 1999). Jurors, however, may have difficulty differentiating a highly reliable method of placing a defendant at the scene of a crime from one that demonstrates culpability.
Criminal trials involving confessions may or may not include this
type of forensic evidence. Likewise, a confession’s validity may or
may not be called into question (e.g., motion to suppress). The potential interaction of these evidence factors raises questions regarding
their importance to jurors’ decision making. In the present study, we
predicted a result consistent with the CSI effect; i.e., that there will
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be an overestimation of forensic evidence reliability (Smith, Stinson,
& Patry, 2007; Stinson, Smith, Patry, Fitzsimmons, & Finey, 2005).
In other words, forensic evidence like DNA may have a significant
impact on participants’ perceptions of guilt, and therefore co-vary
with other factors like psychopathology and Miranda waivers.
The current study examines the relationship between psychopathology, Miranda waiver, and DNA evidence matching the
voluntary confessor. To date, no research has addressed the issue of
perceptions of voluntary confessions when the confessor is prima
facie disbelieved. Additionally, we were interested in opinions about
these factors outside of this paradigm. To this end, we apportioned
part of our sample (n= 74) as a “survey only” condition.
Hypothesis 1: We predicted items measuring confessor guilt,
validity of confession, and evaluations of DNA and confession evidence would differ as a function of DNA corroboration (matching or
not matching the confessor).
Hypothesis 2: We predicted items measuring attitudes towards the interrogation of mentally ill suspects and Miranda would
differ as a function of confessor psychopathology and provision of
Miranda warnings.
Hypothesis 3: Experimental and survey only conditions
would differ in evaluations of confession and DNA evidence.
METHOD
Participants
A convenience sample of one hundred eighty-two undergraduates (108 female, 74 male) participated in this study in exchange
for course credit. All participants were between the ages of 17-34.
Ninety-four percent were Caucasian and unmarried. More than half
of the sample were politically liberal (68%); 30% were conservative. Fifty-four percent reported being related to a law enforcement
officer. All participants were treated in accordance with APA ethical
considerations.
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Materials
Stimulus materials included a two-page summary depicting
a voluntary confession. The Appendix displays one variation of our
manipulation: italicized information denotes our independent variables. In order to preserve the ecological validity of the stimulus materials, level of psychopathology was operationalized as the specific
characteristics put forward in the actual case. This meant presenting
some of the behaviors listed as the diagnostic criteria for pedophilia
(DSM-IV, 1994, p. 571-572).
Our dependent variables consisted of a twenty-six item questionnaire measuring evaluations of: confessor’s guilt, validity of the
confession, reliability of confession and DNA evidence, Miranda
issues, and the process of interrogation and confession involving a
suspect with a mental illness. Some participants (n = 74) served as a
comparison group (“survey only” condition) completing only items
concerning reliability and probative-validity of DNA and confession evidence, as well as attitudes towards interrogating mentally ill
suspects.
Design and Procedure
After participants provided consent, the experimental group
(n = 109) first read the confession summary and responded to items
relating to the facts of the summary and demographics. Summaries
varied based on presence or absence of corroborative DNA evidence,
provision of Miranda warnings prior to confession, and psychopathology evidenced by confessor. All other information remained
constant. Participants in the survey only condition (n = 74) did not
receive stimulus materials and completed only those items related
to the reliability and validity of confession and DNA evidence, attitudes towards Miranda, and interrogations of mentally ill suspects.
Summaries represented a 2 (DNA: match or no match) x 2 (psychopathology: demonstrated or not) x 2 (Miranda: provided or not)
between-subjects design. Survey only data was examined as a third
level of each independent variable.
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RESULTS
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1 was supported. Log-linear analysis revealed a
significant association of DNA condition with the item “true or false
confession,” χ2(1, N = 107) = 6.54, p = .011. When DNA matched
the confessor, 37% of participants believed the confession was true;
when DNA did not match, only 13% believed it was true.
A significant association was also revealed for psychopathology with the item “true or false confession,” χ2(1, N = 107) =
5.01, p = .025. Thirty-one percent of participants in the psychopathology condition believed the confession was true, compared to
13% in the no psychopathology condition. A significant effect was
found for DNA on verdict, χ2(1, N = 107) = 19.88, p = .000. When
DNA matched the confessor, 72% of participants found the confessor guilty, compared to 22% when DNA did not match.
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Univariate ANOVA
revealed a main effect of psychopathology on the item “a mentally
ill person should not be interrogated,” F(1, 178) = 3.58, p = .032,
η2 = .03. On a scale of 0 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree,
agreement was strongest in the no psychopathology condition (M =
3.91) compared to psychopathology (M = 1.98).
Univariate ANOVA revealed a significant DNA x Miranda
interaction on the item “obtaining a confession is more important
than providing Miranda protections,” F(1, 175) = 4.94, p = .027, η2
= .02. Participant agreement was highest in conditions where DNA
corroborated the confession and Miranda warnings were provided.
See Table 1 [opposite] for display of interaction means.
Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. One-way ANOVA revealed a main effect for DNA on the item “how reliable is DNA
evidence,” F(2, 179) = 5.45, p = .005. Scheffé’s test of multiple
comparisons revealed significant differences between survey only
(M = 6.24) and DNA No Match condition (M = 5.65) at p = .008.
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Table 1
DNA x Miranda Interaction
Obtaining a Confession is More Important than Miranda Protections
(N = 181)
Miranda
DNA
Match
No Match

Provided
3.26
2.38

Not Provided
2.56
3.32

Note. Higher scores indicated agreement on a scale of 0 = strongly disagree to 7 =
strongly agree.

One-way ANOVA showed a main effect for DNA on the item
“how reliable is confession evidence,” F(2, 179) = 12.55, p = .000.
Scheffé’s test of multiple comparison revealed survey only condition differed significantly from DNA Match and No Match conditions (Ms = 4.24 vs. 3.22 and 3.15, respectively) at p = .000. DNA
was perceived as more reliable outside the context of this scenario.
One-way ANOVA revealed a main effect for DNA on the
item “how probative is confession evidence,” F(2, 179) = 3.51, p
= .032. Scheffé’s test of multiple comparisons revealed significant
differences between survey only and DNA No Match condition (Ms
= 4.12 vs. 3.43, respectively) p = .034. Overall, differences between
survey only and experimental conditions were a function of DNA
corroboration. All ratings were made on a scale of 0 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. See Table 2 [below] for display of differences between means on these dependent measures.
Table 2
Participant Ratings of DNA and Confession Evidence:
DNA v. Survey Condition
Participant Ratings

DNA

Survey

How Reliable is DNA Evidence?
5.65
6.24
How Reliable is Confession Evidence?
3.22
4.24
How Probative is Confession Evidence?
3.43
4.12
Note: Judgments were made on 8-point scales (0 = not at all reliable/probative to 7 = very reliable/probative). Means are significantly different at p <
.05.
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DISCUSSION
These findings demonstrate the importance of forensic type
evidence, specifically DNA, on judgments of verdict and evidence
credibility. In a paradigm based on a situation involving an almost
indisputably false confession, decisions of culpability and validity
of confession judgments were explained by the DNA manipulation.
Participant determination of confessor guilt and validity of confession were a function of exposure to the DNA condition when this
evidence matched the confessor. Not only did DNA drive verdict
choice and evaluations of confession, but it also interacted with
Miranda manipulations on participants’ evaluation of obtaining
a confession or provision of Miranda. Mean ratings differed as a
function of DNA match. Disagreement was most pronounced when
DNA did not match, even when warnings were provided. Presence
or absence of Miranda warnings was important, but not as important
as DNA evidence.
Results indicate in general, participants’ evaluations of forensic-type evidence, specifically DNA, were considerably higher
than confession evidence. Consistent with the CSI effect, both survey only and experimental condition mean ratings of reliability and
probative validity of DNA evidence were high. When these perceptions were organized within the experimental scenario, ratings
decreased. When evidence relating to culpability is ambiguous or
circumstantial and a confession is voluntary, participants were less
reliant on the “concrete” confession evidence and focused more on
the ambiguity, or lack of evidence. DNA existed in the “no match”
condition, as did the confession, but guilt was not attributed to the
confessor, and validity of confession was disbelieved. Belief in the
confession was overwhelmingly driven by DNA corroboration. This
finding provides evidence for a culpability or pro-prosecution bias
concerning forensic-type evidence (O’Neil, 2007).
The role of psychopathology and Miranda warnings in participants decision-making process was important, but less so than
DNA. These participants’ favorable attitude towards the interrogation of mentally ill defendants may be due to the moral import of
the offense (sexual assault and murder). The relationship of DNA
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to other types of evidence and the relationship to verdict seemed to
drive participant’s evaluations of other factors relating to the trial.
Participants seemed to organize their evaluation of fact patterns in
terms of their perception of the most salient factors relating to the
ultimate issue.
Why would mean ratings of reliability and probative validity
of DNA evidence be higher than confession evidence? Patterns in
these data suggest when evidence indicates guilt, it is assigned more
probative weight. Conversely, when evidence appears exonerative it
is relegated to a lesser probative status. Given the specific facts of
the paradigm, a conviction bias may have emerged, whereby participants seek evidence to confirm what is perceived as necessary to
do justice.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine a voluntary confession paradigm and the factors involved in their evaluations. It is important to point out, however, that the magnitude of
participant-jurors’ responses to various evidential issues in this type
of research study can be exaggerated due to the limited amount of
information made available to them. This type of problem is not
atypical in laboratory research summarizing complex legal and psychological information. In this study, we attempted to minimize this
problem by using ecologically valid materials including: the biography of confessor, details about the abduction, confession, and the
crime. We are confident that our approach to examining this topic
drew on the strengths of both internal and external validity; however, we are also cognizant of researchers’ concerns when generalizing
results involving judicial decision making (Bornstein, 1999; Myers
& Greene, 2004). The value of this study is the insight offered into
the influential effect of DNA in the presence of other legal and psychological factors, e.g., psychopathology and Miranda warnings.
Future research should address the configuration of evidence type
and fact patterns to assess discernable relationships and other significant operating factors.
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APPENDIX
In 1995, a child was found dead in the woods behind her
home. Police immediately focused on those who had a close relationship with her. After eliminating her parents, acquaintances, and
relatives, the investigators were frustrated. Although they had DNA,
they did not find a matching suspect. Richard Tolman confessed 8
years after the killing.
The following is a summary of a confession provided by
Richard Tolman, a 39-year-old schoolteacher. This man was never
a suspect in the original murder investigation, although he had limited contact with the victim. Everything about his confession was
voluntary, including making contact with investigators. Mr. Tolman
received and waived his Miranda warnings before making any statements. Richard Tolman was interrogated, but customary interrogation tactics were not needed. Mr. Tolman provided detailed information to investigators about how, when, where, and why he allegedly
committed this act. Mr. Tolman insists, however, the death was an
accident and not premeditated.
Biography of Confessor
Richard Tolman was a married 5th-grade teacher at the time
of the murder. He had no children of his own. He had no contact
with law enforcement until 8 months after the murder, when he was
charged with possession of child pornography. Investigators found
pictures of the victim, clothed, on his computer. A plea-bargain and
5 years of probation kept Mr. Tolman out of prison. He had prior mental health contact, and was prescribed benzodiazepines for
anxiety. A provisional diagnosis of pedophilia was charted, but Mr.
Tolman did not satisfy all diagnostic criteria.
The Abduction
Investigator: Tell us how you got access to the victim.
Tolman: I gained her trust gradually. I saw her every once in
a while because of my job.
I loved her very much and didn’t want to hurt her. The day
this happened, I couldn’t resist anymore so I told her I was supposed
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to bring her home and she came with me. We had a special bond, her
and I. I never meant to hurt her. I gave her a drink with diazepam
(valium) crushed up in it and she got sort of lethargic. I knew it was
my responsibility to care for her now, since she was so groggy, but
I couldn’t stop myself anymore. She was beautiful to me. I took her
to my apartment.
The Homicide
Investigator: Tell us about how she died.
Tolman: <tearful> I got angry when she resisted me. I think
she actually hit or scratched my face. I also had klonopins (a benzodiazepine) and thought she would calm down if I mixed more in her
drink. I said I was sorry and let her drink more while she watched
TV. I started to make love to her again and she just didn’t respond,
like she was ignoring me. But then I realized her breathing was really shallow. I was so nervous I thought I hurt her. I was afraid that
she would blame me and hate me for hurting her. I wanted to show
her how much she meant to me, but I just didn’t know what to do. I
knew she loved me. I saw how she looked at me at school, so I was
confused when she resisted. After we made love, I was hugging her
and realized her breathing stopped. We got back in the car and drove
to this area of woods that connects to her back yard. It was in the
woods, about 100 yards from her back door, that I tucked her body
into the ground and covered her.
DNA and Details of the Crime
When this crime took place, there was extensive media coverage. Although case-sensitive details were guarded, much information was nonetheless available. DNA was recovered from underneath
the fingernails of the victim. There was no evidence of sexual assault
other than small vaginal abrasions. No semen was recovered from
the victim. Toxicology screenings showed no evidence of drugs in
the victim’s system. Cause of death was strangulation by ligature.
DNA found on the victim matched Richard Tolman.
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